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Chapter Seven 
Macroeconomic Policy Choices 
What options do the economic authorities in developing economies have 
for policy formation, at the macro and sectoral levels? Limits on policy 
maneuverability vary greatly across economies. In this chapter, we try to sort out 
the possibilities regarding macroeconomic regulation and then take up growth 
and sectoral policy in Chapter 8. 
We start by looking at how private and government net borrowing flows 
and current account balances interact in the short to medium run. Some 
algebraic back-up is provided in Appendix 7.1, which deals with gap models, 
relationships between flow and stock variables, and theories of the exchange 
rate. 
Macroeconomic policy packages appropriate to combinations of financial 
stages and binding gaps are reviewed. The discussion then turns to capital 
management techniques, including controlling international flows and regulating 
domestic financial markets, and central issues of financial development. The 
chapter closes with considerations regarding foreign aid. 
 
Pro-Cyclical Macroeconomic Adjustment and the Three Gaps 
 Patterns of net borrowing as presented in Chaper 5 are a useful starting 
point for analyzing macroeconomic developments. As detailed in Appendix 7.1, 
these flows cumulate into changes in balance sheets of the sort appearing in 
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Table 6.1, weaving a tight web between the real and financial sides of the 
economy. 
 If a sector has positive net borrowing, it is adding to effective demand 
because its expenditure exceeds its income. On the other hand, the sum of all 
sectors’ net borrowings must be zero as a condition for macroeconomic 
equilibrium, i.e.,: 
Net Private Borrowing + Government Borrowing + Current Account Balance = 0 
(The current account is, of course, also “foreign net borrowing” – that is, net 
borrowing by the rest of the world from the country whose accounts we are 
looking at). 
It is also helpful to consider how net borrowing flows might behave out of 
equilibrium. For example, would an increase in private income induce private 
spending to rise by more or less than the income increase itself? A greater 
increase in spending than income means that the private sector behaves “pro-
cyclically”; a lesser increase is “counter-cyclical.” A moment’s thought suggests 
that if out-of-equilibrium total net borrowing behaves pro-cyclically, then the 
macro system is bound for trouble. A small income increase will kick up spending 
by a greater amount, which will presumably bid up output and income still more, 
and so on. This sort of instability is never observed, so it is safe to conclude that 
total net borrowing is in fact counter-cyclical. 
 Figure 7.1 illustrates a situation in which all three sectoral net borrowing 
flows are counter-cyclical – i.e. when income goes up private expenditure rises 
by a lesser amount (or investment increases by less than saving), exports grow 
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less than imports (so that the current account balance deteriorates), and taxes 
rise more than government spending. The curve for total net borrowing is just the 
vertical sum of the three sectoral curves. The point at which it crosses the 
horizontal axis is the equilibrium level of output.  
 Figure 7.1 
 The private sector in Figure 7.1 has a surplus (negative net borrowing) 
and lends to the government and to the rest of the world. If the private net 
borrowing curve shifts upward (the private surplus falls due to an investment 
increase, for example) then so would the total. The economy would arrive at a 
new equilibrium with a higher output level (a point to the right of the initial 
equilibrium) associated with a lower fiscal deficit and current account balance.  
 In practice, not all observed sectoral levels of net borrowing are counter-
cyclical. For example, in data for the US with the private sector separated into 
households and business, only the government behaves counter-cyclically, the 
two private sub-sectors are pro-cyclical, and the current account is basically a-
cyclical (Barbosa-Filho, et. al., 2008). Several of the regions illustrated in Chapter 
5 face a similar phenomenon: private net borrowing tends to increase during 
upswings.  
 The macroeconomic implications are sketched in Figure 7.2, in which the 
private sector behaves pro-cyclically with the other two counter-cyclical. The total 
net borrowing curve still has a negative slope, but it is very shallow. An increase 
in private borrowing will again shift the total curve upward, leading to higher 
output.  Because the slope of the total curve is so shallow, the output increase 
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would be very large and could hit resource limits, kicking off inflation or an 
external crisis, due in the latter case to a sharp deterioration in the current 
account. In short, pro-cyclical spending by the private sector generates strong 
business cycle swings, and creates additional risks of inflation and/or balance of 
payments crises.  
 Figure 7.2 
 The dire situation in Figure 7.2 would be even more likely if the 
government itself behaves pro-cyclically, as discussed in Chapter 1. Offsetting 
policies are possible but difficult, as discussed below. 
 Stemming from the work of Hollis Chenery (e.g. Chenery and Bruno, 
1962), there is a long tradition in development economics devoted to the analysis 
of net borrowing functions in the form of “gaps.”1 The terminology is meant to 
suggest that an excessively large positive level of net borrowing by the private 
sector (the “resource or savings gap”) or the government (the “fiscal gap”), or a 
large current account deficit (the “external gap”) is likely to lead the economy into 
trouble. Empirical gap analysis of net borrowing flows as discussed in Chapter 5 
follows directly from Chenery’s perspective. 
 For example, we can consider the circa 1980 interest rate shock 
discussed in Chapter 2, accompanied by a virtual cut-off of new foreign lending. 
A country such as Brazil, which previously had a big current account deficit and 
                                                            
1 See Taylor (1994) for a brief history and an interpretation somewhat different 
from the one herein. 
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was taking on more debt, even to finance its debt service obligations,2 had to 
transfer the hard currency service obligations abroad out of its own resources. 
Moreover, in the aftermath of the shock, most countries effectively nationalized 
the debt that had been taken out by the private (or public enterprise) sector and 
shifted the burden to the government.  
 The repercussions were rather complicated but a typical set can be traced 
through in Figure 7.3. Initial conditions include highly pro-cyclical private sector 
net borrowing and large external and fiscal gaps. The schedule for the current 
account shifts upward because net new external borrowing becomes impossible 
(aside from “informal” loans in the form of increased payment arrears). 
Superficially, this looks like an improvement in external balance that should lead 
to an increase in effective demand but appearances are deceiving in this case. 
Net exports are not going up; rather what is required is a greater transfer of 
resources abroad. Basically that has to be accomplished by cutting imports to 
satisfy the (now) binding foreign exchange constraint, although real devaluation 
and directed policy can also reduce import demand for a given level of output 
and increase export supply. 
 Figure 7.3 
 The most effective way to reduce imports is through contraction of 
aggregate demand. The question at hand is how the reduction will be allocated 
between the fiscal and the private resource gaps. A complicating factor is that 
imports of capital goods are likely to be an important component of total 
                                                            
2 In Minsky’s terminology introduced in Chapters 1 and 6, the economy was 
engaging in Ponzi finance which was abruptly cut off. 
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investment, so that reducing the resource gap by curtailing new capital formation 
may be an effective means to satisfy the external constraint. Of course, with 
investment slashed, future growth prospects will be hurt. 
  As Figure 7.3 is drawn, government net borrowing declines modestly 
because it has assumed the private sector’s debt service. The rest of the 
adjustment burden is carried by the private sector, which may take place through 
reductions in consumption  imposed by the inflation tax. An inflation-induced cut 
in real wages (generating “forced savings”) can also play a central role in 
reducing real private consumption. In the diagram as drawn, the private sector 
shifts from being a net borrower to a net lender. The fiscal gap declines but 
remains positive. Because the total net borrowing schedule has a shallow 
negative slope, there is a substantial output reduction. 
 Run in reverse, Figure 7.3 shows one possible response to a foreign 
exchange bonanza which allows a much bigger external deficit. The real question 
is, how long can favorable conditions be maintained? 
 In summary, two crucial stabilization problems that developing countries 
may confront are a binding external gap (which can arise either due to adverse 
developments such as plummeting terms of trade on the current account or – 
more common in recent years – destabilizing capital movements) and pro-
cyclical behavior on the part of the private and/or public sector. There is also the 
possibility of pro-cyclical financial destabilization as discussed in Chapter 6. What 
sorts of policies can be deployed to stabilize the macro system under 
combinations of these circumstances? 
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 To answer the latter question, we look first at macroeconomic policy, and 
then at capital management (capital account and prudential regulations). A third 




Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Policy 
 As we have seen, pro-cyclical private and government behavior can easily 
destabilize the economy. A first rule of macroeconomic policy is, therefore, that 
the government should avoid pro-cyclical fiscal policy and rather run it in the 
opposite fashion to counter pro-cyclical private sector behavior. As we will see 
below, in economies that have opened their capital account, counter-cyclical 
monetary policy faces severe constraints and, therefore, the need for a fiscal 
policy that tries to smooth the business cycle is even more acute. However, 
putting in place counter-cyclical fiscal policies is not an easy task  
 One possibility is the use of fiscal stabilization funds to “store” temporary 
revenue upswings from taxes on raw material exports with surging prices. Well 
designed tax systems, which capture in taxes a significant part of the upswings in 
incomes (for example, progressive income tax schemes) are an essential 
ingredient for such counter-cyclical management – obviously, if they are not 
spent. The funds could then be accumulated as foreign exchange reserves, or in 
sovereign wealth funds, which, as we will see below, also provide “self-
insurance” against sudden stops in external financing as well as export price 
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collapses. More aggressive counter-cyclical policies could take the form of taxes 
on exports and capital inflows (the unremunerated reserve requirements on 
capital inflows imposed by central banks, which we will discuss later, have an 
equivalent effect). 
 There is also the possibility of adjusting government outlays counter-
cyclically, but long debates over “fine tuning” suggest that discretionary changes 
in public spending may be difficult to use effectively, as they involve significant 
lags in the approval and implementation process. Automatic stabilizers are much 
better. A well-designed safety net to protect vulnerable groups during crises 
(preferably as part of a permanent social protection system) is an automatic 
stabilizer that can play beneficial macroeconomic and social roles. This is a 
major mechanism in industrial countries, for example in the form of 
unemployment insurance. 
 Although they are difficult to design and apply in practice, setting up rules 
for balancing the government deficit over the cycle is also a desirable policy goal. 
The most appropriate rule in this regard is one establishing that the government 
would aim at a sustainable “structural” deficit – i.e., a deficit adjusted to pro-
cyclical swings in tax revenues and the costs of safety nets used as automatic 
stabilizers. If a rule such as this is followed, spending, excluding that associated 
with safety nets, would follow a long-term steady pace, and current fiscal deficits 
would fall during booms and increase during crisis. In the graphical 
representation of Figures 7.1 to 7.3, the government net borrowing requirements 
































                    Figure 7.3: Reactions to an adverse external shock 
 
This rule could be mixed with another one, which would target a deficit 
equivalent to public sector investment requirements. This would make the rule 
equivalent to what the British came to call the fiscal “golden rule” – essentially, 
the government only borrows in the long term to invest. 
In any case, neither the golden nor the structural rule should avoid the use 
of fiscal policy as a strong stabilization devise when needed. Discretionary public 
sector spending policies would be called to support an economic recovery when 
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private demand is very weak, and cuts in spending to moderate aggregate 
demand when private spending is exuberant. Tax cuts and hikes can also play 
those roles through the cycles. However, changes in public sector spending have 
a direct effect on aggregate demand, whereas variations in taxes only have an 
indirect effect.  
 
Interest Rates 
As argued in Chapter 1, low and stable real interest rates can support 
investment in productive capacity and growth. However, a major challenge of 
monetary policy is that open capital markets in effect put a floor under local rates 
and generate pro-cyclical behavior.  
The reasons why rest upon straightforward financial arbitrage. Consider 
an investor comparing borrowing costs within the country and in foreign markets. 
In local currency terms, his or her real cost of funds for loans from abroad will be 
the base foreign borrowing rate (such as dollar LIBOR at a “normal” pre-crisis 
level of about 3% per year in mid-2008) plus the market risk premium for the 
country concerned (about 2%) plus the expected nominal rate of depreciation 
which increases the local cost of paying off the loan in dollars.3  
For a “typical” country, the sum of these three items prior to the 2007-08 
crisis  might have been 8-10% but in the not-so-distant past or after the 
                                                            
3 In algebraic form, let i be the local lending rate, the foreign borrowing rate, *i
 the risk premium, and  the expected rate of depreciation (the "hat" notation 
denotes a growth rate, ). Then interest rate arbitrage (usually called 
“interest rate parity” in the literature) as described in the text will give rise to the 
equation      
Eeˆ
e (ˆ  edtde /)/
Eeii ˆ*  
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September 2008 financial meltdown, it could easily have exceeded 20%, 
because both risk premia and expected depreciation were higher. This borrowing 
cost acts as a floor for interest rates in local currency, which we can refer to as 
the “parity” interest rate. Imperfect competition in the banking sector and high 
reserve requirements on deposits could work together to raise lending rates 
above the floor and drive deposit rates below it. 
The major complication is that risk premia for developing countries tend to 
increase during crisis, at the same time that the scarcity of foreign exchange 
generates exchange rate depreciation. The result is that the floor for domestic 
interest rates tends to increase at the time when the economy enters into a 
recession, tending to worsen it. In turn, when external financing is abundant, risk 
premia tend to fall and exchange rate depreciation pressures moderate or are 
replaced by appreciation. So, parity interest rates tend to fall when the economy 
expands rapidly. If such a trend is transmitted domestically, it would further fuel 
the boom. These pro-cyclical swings in parity interest rates4 are a major reason 
why the curve for the private sector gap tends to have the positive slope depicted 
in Figures 7.2 and 7.3 rather than the negative slope of Figure 7.1. The result, as 





4 Note that we emphasize the effect of these swings in interest rates, which is 
pro-cyclical, even if according to traditional descriptions interest rates are 
counter-cyclical, in the sense that they move in the opposite direction to the 
business cycle (fall during booms, increase during crises). 
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Pro-cyclical swings in interest rates are just the opposite of the standard 
counter-cyclical prescription for monetary management. It says that rates should 
be reduced during crises and increased during booms. In an economy with Stage 
II (or higher) finance, open market operations by the central bank are the 
instrument of choice.  
Current orthodoxy has abandoned simple monetarist inflation models in 
favor of “inflation targeting.” The theory first appeared in industrialized 
economies. It amounts to a bossa nova riff on Say’s Law.5 Full employment of 
labor is now called a NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment), 
an acronym only an economist could love. Estimating the NAIRU econometrically 
turns out to be difficult, if only because it is an intercept term in a regression 
equation for the inflation rate. The first thing one learns in elementary 
econometrics is that intercept terms jump around a lot! 
Be that as it may, under the now widely accepted “Taylor rule”, the central 
bank is supposed to reduce the short-term interest rate when inflation falls below 
an unstated or pre-announced target and, in the opposite case, to increase the 
rate when inflation is above the target.6 If inflation is determined exclusively by 
demand, this turns out to be a counter-cyclical rule. In a simplistic model, inflation 
would rise when unemployment falls below its NAIRU level and increase when it 
is above it. The rule would therefore tend to stabilize unemployment around the 
                                                            
5 In Brazilian 1950s slang “bossa” was more or less equivalent to the 
contemporary American “smooth.” So inflation targeting is the newer smoother 
Say’s Law. 
6 See Taylor (1993). For all practical purposes, in the 1890s Wicksell proposed 
the same rule based on a “natural” interest rate. 
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NAIRU level. An “independent” central bank (basically meaning that the bank 
does not report directly to the Ministry of Finance) is supposed to lend credibility 
to the inflation target. 
The counter-cyclical effect may be absent if the source of rising inflation is 
not domestic demand but a supply shock, such as the sharp oil and food price 
hikes of the first half of 2008. A simple rule would be that the central bank should 
simply ignore these shocks as temporary. But if it fears that they will generate 
additional increases in wages and prices (the so called “second round effects”), 
which risk transforming the price shock into permanent acceleration in inflation, it 
would try to counteract the price hikes by increasing the interest rate. The result 
is that the central bank would transform the supply shock into a reduction of 
economic activity.  
In developing countries, not much attention is paid to the NAIRU and any 
monetary analysis must bring the exchange rate and capital flows into the 
picture. These generate two major complications. First of all, and as noted 
above, counter-cyclical interest rate policy goes against the logic of pro-cyclical 
swings in parity interest rates. By trying to increase domestic interest rates during 
booms, when parity rates tend to fall, the central bank would generate a great 
inducement to additional capital inflows, which would in turn reinforce the 
tendency of the exchange rate to appreciate. The opposite is true during crises, 
when reductions in domestic interest rates could encourage capital flight, as 
parity rates increase. 
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The second complication is that the exchange rate enters into the 
formation of domestic prices, directly through imported and exported consumer 
goods, and indirectly through the cost structure of firms that import inputs for their 
production. This linkage belongs to the category of supply shocks on the price 
level discussed above, which are favorable during booms. The stronger currency 
leads to slower inflation and helps the central bank meet its target. Joint 
appreciation and capital inflows can lead to a boom with low inflation, but only at 
the cost of growing external deficits that create vulnerability to a sudden stop in 
external financing. 
The other way round, during downswings attempts to reduce the interest 
rate would tend to reinforce depreciation pressures and induce additional capital 
outflows. The effects of exchange rate depreciation on domestic prices now 
operate as an adverse supply shock, and may lead monetary authorities 
following inflation targeting to increase rather than reduce interest rates, thus 
reinforcing the recession. 
Therefore, so long as the logic of parity interest rates is pro-cyclical, the 
capacity of central banks to manage rates in a counter-cyclical fashion is limited 
and may actually reinforce the pro-cyclicality of capital flows – and, therefore, of 
private sector net borrowing and associated spending — and generate exchange 
rate volatility. Due to the effects of the exchange rate on the domestic price level, 
the monetary authorities may in practice (as in Brazil and Mexico, for example7) 
fight depreciation during crisis but tolerate appreciation during booms. This would 
                                                            
7 See Barbosa-Filho (2008) and Galindo and Ros (2008). 
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tend to generate high average interest rates and a strong exchange rate over the 
business cycle, to the detriment of real economic activity. 
In sum, pro-cyclical swings in parity interest rates reduce the room of 
maneuver of monetary authorities to undertake truly counter-cyclical policy. The 
other side of the same coin is that authorities may simply shift the problem to the 
exchange rate. In the current account, appreciation during booms tends to 
generate large deficits that make the economy extremely vulnerable to sharp 
reversals in the availability and/or cost of external financing. As noted above, a 
positive slope of the private sector net borrowing schedule may be the result, 
which results in turn in large swings in economic activity.  
The only way to break the deadlock involves a mix of two complementary 
policies. The first is to smooth out exchange rate swings, through heavy 
intervention in foreign exchange markets. The second is to delink, at least 
partially, the association between domestic and parity interest rates through 
capital account regulations. We now turn our attention to these issues. 
 
Foreign exchange reserve management 
From a stabilization perspective, the basic rationale for heavy intervention 
in foreign exchange markets comes clearly from the previous discussion: it helps 
smooth out the effects of strong external shocks generated by swings in external 
financing (that, persistent shocks on the current account curve in Figures 7.1 to 
7.3), and helps in particular to avoid the strong swings in parity interest rates, as 
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the exchange rate is one of its determinants. In addition, there are additional 
justifications for such interventions from a developmental perspective. 
Reserve accumulation during booms should therefore help smooth out the 
effects of pro-cyclical capital flows on exchange rates. If adequately sterilized, 
such policy would make it possible to target both the exchange rate and the 
interest rate, thus avoiding the “trilemma” of open economies.8 A similar logic 
applies to primary commodity exporting countries facing terms of trade shocks. 
Indeed, saving some of the exceptional export revenues and associated fiscal 
revenues is a good practice, as noted above. More generally, it can be argued 
that cyclical swings in export revenues should be managed through cyclical 
swings in foreign exchange reserves (or sovereign wealth funds) that would 
accumulate the excess supply of foreign exchange during booms to be used 
during the succeeding crises. 
The very strong crises of the late 1990s led developing countries to use 
this policy instrument in an active and in some cases aggressive way. The Asian 
countries led the way, but the trend was much broader and massive.9 This was 
also a response to the fact that the Asian and Russian crises of 1997 and 1998 
revealed the lack of adequate institutions to manage crises that originated in 
                                                            
8 The trilemma refers to the view that it is impossible to target simultaneously the 
interest and the exchange rate when the capital account is open. The standard 
references are Mundell (1963), Fleming (1962), and any textbook on open 
economy macro. Frenkel and Taylor (2007), Frenkel (2007) and Taylor (2008b) 
elaborate on the points summarized here. 
9 In 2007, for example, foreign exchange reserve accumulation by developing 
countries was equivalent to 8% of GDP, out of which close to 6% of GDP 
originated in the capital account. 
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sudden stops in external financing, as well as the excessive conditionalities 
associated to those that were available, mostly emergency IMF financing. In 
other words, in the absence of collective insurance provided by an international 
institution (the type of insurance that governments and central banks provide to 
financial systems domestically), “self insurance” became the only available option 
to manage sharp swings in external financing. 
Self-insurance against financial crises requires that countries should keep 
foreign exchange reserves at least equivalent to short-term external liabilities, 
which can easily fly away during crises (this is called the Guidotti-Greenspan 
rule). But it should certainly go beyond it, because long-term capital flows can 
also be sharply cut during crises. The precautionary demand for international 
reserves should therefore be proportional to total external liabilities, a proportion 
which furthermore should be larger the more open the capital account is.10  
Exchange rate intervention also has developmental objectives that go 
beyond smoothing the effects of capital account fluctuations (and, no doubt, 
include some “mercantilist” motives). As we will see in Chapter 8 and 9, a 
competitive exchange rate may have positive effects on growth. Avoiding sharp 
fluctuations in real exchange rates is also crucial to give stable incentives to 
                                                            
10 An additional reason for heavy interventions in foreign exchange markets is the 
“financial stability” motive (Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2008). The major 
argument is that financially open economies must hold reserves against capital 
flight, particularly the desire to convert domestic money balances (defined in a 
broad sense) into foreign exchange during crises. However, it is difficult to 
separate this from the “self-insurance” motive. 
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exporters and producers of goods and services that compete with imports – that 
is to producers of tradable goods and services. These two motivations are, of 
course, interrelated, as reduced price volatility for tradables encourages 
investment in those sectors. Avoiding, in particular, natural resource and capital 
account booms from generating a strong appreciation of the exchange rate that 
destroys non-natural resource sector production and export sectors (the Dutch 
disease again) is crucial. 
The drawback of interventions in foreign exchange markets is, of course, 
that reserve accumulation is expensive because the riskless hard currency 
securities in which developing countries invest their reserves pay very low real 
interest rates, and are subject to the volatility of exchange rates among major 
currencies. Furthermore, reserve increases must often be sterilized to avoid 
sharp swings in domestic money supply and lending (see Chapter 6). If central 
bank or government bonds are used as the sterilization instrument, the 
associated interest rates are commonly higher that the returns from investing the 
reserves abroad, and thus generate losses for central banks (usually called 
“quasi-fiscal” deficits). 
 
Capital Management Techniques 
 Liquidity transformations, as discussed in Chapter 6, have been a prime 
source of instability in developing economies. Together with liquid assets such as 
international reserves, countries’ liability structures play a crucial role when there 
are external constraints. Particularly, if there is a sudden stop in external 
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financing, short-term capital is likely to fly away rapidly. They also affect the 
behavior of private sector net borrowing requirements, tending to make them pro-
cyclical. Foreign exchange reserves can serve as a protection mechanism to 
manage these swings, but it is an expensive one, as indicated above. Capital 
account regulation then becomes an essential policy tool to manage these 
destabilizing effects 
. 
Capital Account Regulations 
Viewed as a debt management instrument, capital controls build on the 
fact that the market penalizes unsound external debt profiles. During booms, 
regulations should therefore be aimed at improving the debt maturity profiles of 
external liabilities of both the public and private sectors. As a liability (not figuring 
explicitly in Table 6.1), foreign direct investment (FDI) has also proven to be less 
volatile than portfolio and debt flows and creates risk-sharing between domestic 
and foreign investors. On the other hand, FDI generally carries higher costs than 
other forms of external financing. 
Viewed as a macroeconomic policy instrument, capital account regulation 
aims at reducing unstable international financial flows, often the root cause of 
boom-bust cycles, and at increasing the room to maneuver for monetary 
authorities. It can help them “lean against the wind” in an upswing by permitting 
contractionary monetary policy and reducing pressure for appreciation. Costly 
reserve accumulation and sterilization can also be held down. In a crisis, capital 
controls can create room for expansionary monetary policy. In either direction, 
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regulation can help the authorities combine counter-cyclical monetary policy with 
active exchange rate targeting for developmental purposes. 
In practice, capital market regulations segment domestic and international 
markets, but this reflects the fact that markets are themselves segmented. The 
strong pro-cyclical flows towards developing countries are indeed a consequence 
of segmentation, in which developing countries are perceived as “risky” 
borrowers and thus receive large flows when during periods in which financial 
market agents have “appetite for risk” but are then subject to sudden stops when 
there is “flight to quality” (see Chapter 1). 
Traditional “quantity” controls of the type used in China and India (but 
being gradually dismantled in these countries, as in others before) openly 
differentiate between residents and non-residents, and between corporate and 
non-corporate agents among the former. Prohibitions or ceilings may be imposed 
on foreign borrowing by domestic residents, and/or on foreign investors taking 
positions in domestic securities. There may be limitations on various forms of 
lending and borrowing in foreign currency by banks. 
“Market-based” controls, practiced in recent decades in Latin America and 
Malaysia, include taxes or an unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) on 
inflows, and/or exit taxes on outflows. Market-based instruments tend to be more 
non-discretionary than direct methods. 
Following Ocampo (2008), a large literature on these experiences leads to 
five main conclusions: 
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Controls on both inflows and outflows can work, but the authorities must 
be able to administer regulation while closing loopholes and (especially) avoiding 
corruption. Permanent regulatory regimes that can be tightened or loosened in 
response to market conditions, including the cycle, are probably preferable to 
repeated retractions and reinstatements of the rules. 
Exchange controls and quantitative restrictions may be the best means to 
hold down domestic sensitivity to international capital flows (witness China’s and 
India’s avoidance of the Asian crisis in the late 1990s11). In contrast, URRs and 
similar measures may only have temporary effects on capital inflows (especially if 
they are not ratcheted up during a surge), but they do influence interest rate 
spreads and, in this sense, are a useful complement to counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies. 
URRs and other reserve requirements help hold down short-term debt, 
which is highly volatile and thus a significant source of vulnerability. 
To guarantee that capital market regulations can be effective, some 
intervention in current account transactions may be required as well. Export 
surrender obligations or requirements to channel trade transactions through 
approved intermediaries are examples in point. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, controls are a complement to other 
macro policies, for both stabilization and maintenance of sound macro prices, not 
a substitute for them.  
                                                            
11 India’s prior crisis in 1991 was caused by an unsustainable current account 
position under strict capital controls. 
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Capital controls obviously have costs. They increase the cost of financing 
during surges, but that is precisely what they are supposed to do. In the longer 
term, they can inhibit the development of derivatives markets and discourage 
operations by foreign institutional investors who may act as domestic market 
makers. The trade-offs between short-term effectiveness of capital controls and 
their possibly unfavorable long-term repercussions are not simple but do have to 
be borne in mind. 
 
Prudential Regulation 
 The distinction between capital account and prudential regulations 
affecting cross-border flows is not clear-cut. Both instruments are aimed at 
making the financial system more stable and effective. 
One area of concern is foreign currency borrowing by non-financial firms 
and households which have no revenues in foreign currency – that is, that 
produce non-tradable goods and services.12 Various restrictions can be imagined 
but perhaps the simplest is prohibiting firms and households without foreign 
currency revenues from borrowing abroad or domestically in foreign currency. 
Alternatively, prudential regulation on such borrowing can be imposed, such as 
requirements on financial institutions that provide the lending to hold more capital 
to back these operations or to make larger provisions for loan losses. 
                                                            
12 A similar case is borrowing by financial firms to acquire bonds issued in 
domestic currency by firms producing non-traded goods. 
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 The macroeconomic risks we have analyzed should also be a central 
concern of prudential regulation, as they affect the health of the financial system. 
Traditionally, microeconomic risk management has been directed toward 
reducing the risks that depends on the characteristics of individual borrowers. But 
there are additional sources of risk, which are associated with economic policy 
changes (e.g., changes in interest and exchange rates), with volatility in external 
financing and with pro-cyclical private sector behavior, particularly during boom 
periods. 
The situation is made worse by the pro-cyclicality of traditional regulatory 
tools, including the international standards issued by the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision. To add to the discussion of pro-cyclical leverage in Chapter 
6, it is helpful to work through an example involving loan-loss provisions (or 
reserves), which tend to be tied to current delinquencies or short-term 
expectations about them. In an upswing delinquencies are low; this fact and the 
consequent need to make limited provisions can encourage risk-taking. In a 
crisis, a jump in delinquencies rapidly exhausts existing provisions. Financial 
institutions will have to use their capital to cover losses, but then, given 
regulatory requirements, their capacity to lend, which is a multiple of their 
capital,13 is limited. As losses of several financial institutions mount and capital is 
reduced, this can easily lead to an economy wide credit squeeze. They could 
also sell some of their assets, but this is hardly a solution when many financial 
institutions want to do it at the same time. The fire sale of the assets under these 
                                                            
13 Strictly speaking, regulations establish risk weights for different assets, with 
institutions being required to hold larger capital for riskier assets. 
  25
conditions generates considerable losses and thus a credit squeeze is not 
spared. Needless to say, such problems can be especially severe in developing 
countries just entering into Stage IV and V finance. 
Most banks and other financial institutions tend to make provisions close 
in time to when loans are supposed to come due and are not expected to be 
paid. The insurance industry, however, makes provisions when an insurance 
policy is issued. The analog for banks would be to build up provisions when loans 
are disbursed rather than when repayments (or, rather the lack of repayments) 
are expected. This sort of action counters the financial cycle, because it amounts 
to an increase in the banks’ own-funds (  in Table 6.1) during boom, which 
will give them more room of maneuver to manage losses during crises. 
Under this system, provisions build up during an upswing and can be 
accumulated in a fund (along with special back-up for non-performing assets or 
borrowers under stress). The fund can be drawn down in a slump to cover loan 
and other asset losses. This system would be only cycle-neutral, as it essentially 
follows the pro-cyclicality of lending, but that is a still a considerable advance 
over current practices. This is a practice introduced by Spain in 2000. An 
alternative, which some analysts have suggested recently, is to directly increase 
capital requirements during booms, i.e., to force financial institutions to increase 
 through explicit capital injections and not through provisions.14 
More directly counter-cyclical rules regarding changes in the credit 
exposure of financial institutions would also be desirable. In particular, general or 
                                                            
14 See, for example, Goodhart and Persaud (2008). 
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sector-specific increases in provisions could be forced onto financial agents 
when there is an excessive growth of credit relative to a benchmark, a bias in 
lending toward sectors subject to strong cyclical swings, and (again) growth in 
foreign currency loans to sectors producing non-tradable goods and services. 
Indeed, all currency mismatches on balance sheets as well as in expected 
income and payment flows are hazardous and should be subject to provisions.15  
A final and crucial issue for counter-cyclical management is mark-to-
market pricing of assets. This practice is good from the point of view of 
transparency of the balance sheets of financial agents, but has strong pro-
cyclical effects, as asset prices (for stocks and real estate) are strongly pro-
cyclical. A similar effect is associated to the prices of assets that serve as loan 
collateral. If no relevant market happened to be at hand (as was the case for 
complex instruments such as collateralized debt obligations), regulations usually 
require that prices be constructed using models, with the consequences 
described in Chapter 6. During booms, both practices feed into a credit boom 
based on capital gains that have a high cyclical component. During crises, the 
associated capital losses forces financial institutions to sell some assets, but the 
fire sale of such assets worsens the problem, as previously indicated. 
Thus, even if mark-to-market pricing continues to be preferred for 
transparency reasons, some mechanism has to be introduced to avoid cyclical 
price booms from feeding into leverage, such as limits on the values of assets 
                                                            
15 There are other regulatory provisions that can be used to discourage certain 
types of lending, for example, regulations on down payments for mortgages or 
the proportion of credit card lending that must be paid monthly. 
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that can be used as a backing for credit or bond issues. For institutions in trouble 
during crises, “regulatory forbearance” in the sense of not imposing mark-to-
market in a downswing might be appropriate, though it also has its downsides.16 
In any case, regulations which act counter-cyclically in a downswing (such as 
regulatory forbearance) and do nothing in an upswing do not encourage 




To close out this discussion and lay the ground for the analysis in Chapter 
6, it makes sense to take a look at foreign aid. Aid largely flows to economies 
with Stage I (or at highest Stage II) financial structures. In Table 6.1 it allows the 
government to take on more foreign loans  and reduce its borrowing  
and  from the banks, presumably with stabilizing monetary consequences. 
Its immediate macroeconomic impacts can be visualized in terms of 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2. The extra resources allow the government net borrowing 
schedule to shift upward via greater spending or tax cuts. The latter would also 
stimulate private net borrowing directly. The two upward shifts would lead to 
                                                            
16 One famous example involved major US banks at the outset of the Latin 
American debt crisis. Many were technically bankrupt because the market value 
of their Latin American assets was very low. Regulators turned a blind eye, 
allowing the banks to carry the assets on their balance sheets at their value at 
maturity. This was good for the banks, as it avoided an open financial crisis, but it 
implied that the “solution” to the debt crisis was continuous debt renegotiations. 
The costs for Latin America were terrible: a lost decade for development. In a 
sense, Latin America paid  dearly for the lack of transparency in the accounting 
of US banks and the regulatory forbearance that was associated with it. 
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higher imports and the current account curve would shift down to hold the total 
equal to zero. The new schedule for total borrowing would shift upward, leading 
to a higher level of output to the right of the initial equilibrium.  
In effect, the economy is reconfigured to absorb a continuing financial 
inflow. Risks such as an outburst of Dutch disease generated by the exchange 
rate appreciation induced by the additional foreign exchange are, of course, a 
potential outcome. Even if they can be avoided, what would be the implications of 
increased donor contributions for per capita economic growth? We have already 
gone over much of the ground, but it makes sense to revisit it from the angle of 
aid, which has many contradictory aspects.  
A well-known adage from Lao Tzu provides a concise description of two of 
them: “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day” means that external 
assistance can be a dole.  But its true purpose is presumably to “teach a man (or 
a national economy) to fish and … feed him for a lifetime.”  As pointed out in 
Chapter 1, a rule of thumb for successful “fishing” is that the economy sustains at 
least 2% annual per capita output growth. Employment creation should keep 
pace with rising population.  
 Beyond Lao Tzu’s distinction, foreign aid has other complications. It 
certainly has helped launch 2% or faster per capita growth performances in 
diverse policy environments. As has been stressed repeatedly, limited availability 
of hard currency is often the crucial bottleneck in a developing economy, holding 
down both supply and demand. If, as in the discussion above, effective demand 
can increase because foreign exchange is available to pay for the associated 
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imports, it can stimulate private sector investment and innovation. At the same 
time, the imports can bring in essential goods and technologies to raise 
productive capacity. Here are examples: 
 The first, most successful aid efforts were the post-Second World War 
Marshall Plan in Europe and the parallel reconstruction program in Japan. They 
emphasized breaking forex bottlenecks (the “dollar shortage”) via coordinated 
public and private interventions as opposed to the more recent obsession with 
market liberalization. It is worth recalling that the Americans who helped 
implement reconstruction were New Dealers at ease with an interventionist state. 
In the 1960s and 1970s illiberal and bureaucratically planned South Korea 
utilized capital inflows and American-guaranteed market access to create a 
formidable industrial base, beginning with textiles and going on to the world’s 
biggest integrated steel plant and beyond into chip manufacture, automobiles, 
and broadband internet coverage for over 90% of the country. Korea’s 
international economic situation was a consequence of Cold War politics, but its 
planners took full advantage of the opportunities they had available. 
In the “lost decade” of the 1980s, Chile performed better than the rest of 
Latin America’s because it received ample foreign assistance from international 
financial institutions favoring its neo-liberal policy stance. Increasingly 
sophisticated natural resourced-based exports supported economic expansion.  
Several economies in sub-Saharan Africa now have respectable growth 
rates with support from Nordic and other donors who provided steady aid flows 
over decades for their own geopolitical reasons. 
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In all these countries, big shifts in economic structure were created by a 
combination of technocratic top-down policy and spontaneous innovation from 
the bottom up. Even in neo-liberal Chile the government consistently supported 
expansion of mineral and agro-exports. Nowadays, of course, mainstream 
opinion opposes state intervention, a viewpoint virtually ignored at the time of the 
Marshall Plan or South Korea’s growth spurt. 
Over the past two or three decades many aid packages and economic 
“reform” programs informed by the Washington consensus did not generate 
linkages among demand growth, productivity, and employment. Per capita 
income levels did not rise and workers displaced by trade liberalization vanished 
into informal and subsistence activities. Under these conditions, foreign aid 
become at best a dole and at worst a cesspool for corruption.  
Certainly, aid can have positive impacts at the micro level. A hand-out 
from abroad may cure smallpox or alleviate childhood malnutrition, but it is a 
hand-out notwithstanding. As Chapter 3 shows, in recent decades many poor 
economies have seen marked improvements in primary education (and health 
care as well) but have not been able to grow. Even if commendable and 
successful on their own terms, people-oriented technical fixes at the household 
level (as advocated Sachs, 2005) may not directly stimulate economy-wide 
expansion and enduring poverty alleviation. 
Looking toward the future, foreign assistance is bound to be available in 
limited quantities. Cost estimates for the Millennium Development Goals, which 
emphasize quick results, range upward from $150 billion per year. Current aid 
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flows in principle now are on the order of $100 billion including debt relief and 
technical cooperation, which do not transfer resources to the recipient country. 
The International Monetary Fund has not been allowing governments to channel 
forgiven debt toward increased spending on poverty reduction because of its 
phobic fear (not supported by evidence) that an increase in fiscal outlays will kick 
off uncontrollable inflation. 
Even if aid mounts, the IMF relents, and humanitarian goals are realized, 
the MDG effort can only be successful if it puts economies on paths of sustained 
growth. In the past aid has sometimes set off growth, more often it hasn’t. There 
are many challenges to overcome: 
At the micro level, just by itself human capital augmentation will not 
support steady growth unless high productivity enterprises get started. 
Entrepreneurship is essential to this end, and should be rewarded. 
But that will not happen spontaneously in a liberalized market 
environment. The state has to play a strong supportive role. Its available policy 
space has to expand so that countries can use instruments like sensible 
protection levels, targeted credit, and production subsidies to direct their limited 
resources toward productive ends. Scale economies are potentially available in 
many lines of endeavor – the task is to identify and support them. Linking fetters 
on developmentalist policies to disbursements of aid – standard practice for the 
World Bank and IMF – is completely counterproductive. 
Many sub-Saharan African found in recent years a new solution: Chinese 
aid. Based on its own record of strong growth, this donor has of course no 
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objections to a developmentalist state. It focuses on getting the economies to 
grow, based on exploiting the opportunities for raw material exports that China 
itself has generated. And it is not tied to the conditionality of the Bretton Woods 
institutions.
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Appendix 7.1: Net Borrowing, Balance Sheets, and Open Economy Macro 
The first topic in this appendix is how private, government, and the current 
account balance interact. We then show how borrowing flows cumulate into asset 
stocks as illustrated in Table 6.1. Next we discuss the well-known Mundell-
Fleming (or IS/LM/BP) and portfolio balance models from open economy 
macroeconomics, and how they underlie the (misleading) “trilemma” mentioned 
in Chapter 1. The appendix closes with a discussion of dynamic, expectational 
forces that can affect the exchange rate. We work with annual flows of output, 
net borrowing, and other variables from the national income and product 
accounts along with relevant stocks from balance sheets. The symbols can be 
interpreted as being in current market prices or else as “real” (market price 
estimates deflated by a price index), as the situation warrants. 
 Recall from Chapter 1 that in the national accounts national income is 
identified with national output. For present purposes, it makes sense to extend 
the accounting slightly to make total “supply” X equal to value-added Y (or GDP) 
generated within the economy, plus imports  valued in home currency terms 
at the exchange rate e (  stands for imports “at world prices”),  
                  (1) 
The uses of supply are described by the equation 
        (2) 
with C as private consumption, I as investment (gross fixed capital formation plus 
inventory accumulation),G as government spending on goods and services, and 
E as exports.   
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The private sector’s income-expenditure statement can be written as 
   ,      (3) 
which says that the sector’s net borrowing  is equal to its expenditure minus 
income. If outlays exceed inflows, the sector has to increase its net liabilities to 
the rest of the economy.17 
The new entries are taxes T and a “transfer”  to the rest of the world, in 
terms of domestic prices.  Examples are profit remittances, interest payments on 
foreign debt, etc. If a transfer such as emigrant remittances is coming in, it adds 
to income and should be written as  with   as the foreign currency value 
of the inflow from abroad.  
Private saving  is equal to income minus non-investment expenditures, 
i.e. consumption, taxes, and the transfer. Making the obvious substitution in (3) 
shows that net borrowing is equal to investment minus saving, 
   .       
 Government net borrowing  is  
           (4) 
with  as a transfer to the rest of the world (a negative quantity  could 
stand for foreign aid  arriving as foreign exchange in the form of a pure 
donation as opposed to a loan).  
                                                            
17 That is, as illustrated below sectoral asset holdings from Table 6.1 in the forms 
of money, bonds, or equity must be run down, and/or domestic or foreign loans 
must be run up. 
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 The rest of the world’s net borrowing  is equivalent to the home 
country’s acquisition of foreign assets or reduction of its foreign liabilities. The 
transaction has to take place via a surplus on the current account of the balance 
of payments,  
          (5) 
in which  (plus terms representing inflows if needed). 
 Let N be total net borrowing. Assume by way of illustration that private and 
government net borrowing and the current account balance (rest-of-world net 
borrowing flows) all depend on the level of output Y. Then a key condition for 
macroeconomic balance is that 
       (6) 
When (6) is satisfied, running through the income-expenditure accounting shows 
that the “material balance” condition (2) will also hold. 
 Suppose that Y initially satisfies (6) but then “blips” upward. If in response 
 decreases, then the economy’s total spending will fall short of income (total 
net borrowing becomes negative) and one would expect Y to return to the level 
determined by (6). This sort of “counter-cyclical” response stabilizes the system. 
Of course, any one (or two) of , , or  could respond positively (“pro-
cyclically”) to Y but so long as  goes down when Y goes up the economy will 
function. 
When cumulated over time, net borrowing flows generate balance sheets 
like the one presented in Table 6.1. The time period relevant to the present 
discussion is the “short run,” e.g. a month, a quarter, or at most a year.  
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To run through the accounting quickly, let a delta ( ) in front of a variable 
denote its change over time. The growth rate of (say) X will then be . Also 
note that the equity price index  and the exchange rate e are “asset prices” 
which can either “jump” in an instant or move steadily over time. Their growth or 
inflation rates are  and  . Changes in wealth will depend on the 
corresponding capital gains or losses.  
Investment (ignoring depreciation of existing capital and setting changes 
in inventories to zero) is equivalent to a change in the capital stock: 
             .       
The change in private wealth is equal to saving less capital losses on outstanding 
foreign loans or equity when e or  goes up, 
  . 
The private sector’s flow of funds is 
         . 
Liabilities in the form of new loans and/or new issues of equity must go up or else 
holdings of money and government bonds decline when . 
From the rest of the world’s balance sheet in Table 6.1 the home 
economy’s net foreign assets are . Using (4), the flow change in the home 
country’s foreign position can be written as  
        
Incorporating capital losses on loans and equity shows that 
     (7) 
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Equation (7) shows that on a flow basis a current account surplus is 
associated with growth in reserves and reductions in private and/or government 
external debt along with buying back home equity from abroad. As discussed in 
the text, if capital gains and losses are ignored then from (7) the rest of the 
world’s net foreign assets  in its T-account in Table 6.1 will change only 
gradually over time. A consequence is that a “jump” upward or downward of 
foreign loans  or  has to be met by a jump of (nearly) equal size in bank 
reserves . The same observation applies to a foreign equity purchase which 
increases  at the going price  – in the first instance the incoming funds will 
go into international reserves. 
Three other flows of funds equations are also implicit in Table 6.1. The 
simplest assumption for the banking sector is that its net borrowing  is equal to 
zero, which gives 
  ,     (8) 
showing that the increase in the money supply (the banks’ main liability) is equal 
to the sum of increases in loans to the private and financial sectors, holdings of 
government bonds, and international reserves. As with the foreign accounts, a 
jump in any item in the bank’s T-account in Table 6.1 has to be met by an 
offsetting jump on the other side of the balance sheet. For example if reserves 
 move upward, the money supply H has to do so as well (unless the banks 
sterilize the reserve increase by selling off government bonds ).  
 The government’s net borrowing takes the form of bond issues and higher 
foreign loans 
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                . 
 The financial sector borrows from banks or abroad to buy up equity, 
       .  
Capital gains in the form of  feed into an increase in financial wealth , 
which can be plowed back into buying more equity “next period”. Devaluation (an 
increase in the exchange rate e) cuts into the financial sector’s net worth . 
 Finally, a quick look at determination of the exchange rate itself --  the 
Mundell-Fleming and portfolio balance models, the trilemma, and how the rate 
may be set via its static and dynamic linkages with the rest of the system. 
Following Taylor (2004, 2008b), the main points are the following: 
 The Mundell-Fleming (or IS/LM/BP) model postulates that there are three 
Independent open economy macroeconomic relationships: an IS curve to 
determine effective demand, an LM to describe the financial system, and a BP 
relationship to determine the current account. Output, the interest rate, and the 
exchange rate are supposed to adjust to equilibrate the three balances. But in 
fact equation (6) above shows that if the economy is in macro equilibrium the 
current account is already in equilibrium as well, for any value of the exchange 
rate. 
 An immediate corollary is that the trilemma does not hold. In a textbook 
world the macro story needs to focus only on the level of activity and the interest 
rate. In the IS segment of the IS/LM/BP model, domestic and foreign incomes 
adjust to assure the equality in (6). So there is an open capital market, monetary 
policy is setting the interest rate (perhaps along an LM curve), and the exchange 
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rate follows its own rules – the trilemma does not apply. The exchange rate (or 
some other variable such as the fiscal positon) would have to become 
endogenous to allow (6) to balance if the current account were determined 
exogenously or by policy but that is not the way the trilemma is usually 
presented. The structural gap analysis in Chapter 5 is a case in point. 
 Turning to portfolio balance involving stock variables as in Table 6.1, three 
potential possibilities for closing a model are of interest. Each is counter-factual, 
illustrating the problems of applying simple models to functioning economies in 
real time. 
 In one possible closure, the monetary authorities in the home economy 
and the rest of the world intervene in markets to control their holdings of national 
and external bonds, and thus their money supplies at financial Stage II or higher.  
One can show that the interest rates in the two economies can adjust to clear 
their bond and money markets, independently of the exchange rate (there is no 
trilemma).18 
A capital movement into the home economy represents a shift in foreign 
preferences away from foreign and toward home bonds. On standard liquidity 
preference grounds with constant money supplies the home interest rate should 
decline and the foreign rate increase to re-establish local financial market 
equilibria. In fact, in many developing economies the interest rate went up after 
an inflow, suggesting that the authorities pursued contractionary monetary policy 
                                                            
18 This result is the open economy analog of the Stage II closed economy 
liquidity preference scenario in which a single interest rate adjusts to clear both 
bond and money markets. 
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or that there was a strong increase in economic activity which increased money 
demand.  
        In a second closure, the authorities fix interest rates as opposed to money 
supplies. This possibility is akin to inflation targeting as opposed to the first 
closure’s traditional monetarist scenario. With fixed interest and exchange rates, 
asset demands as opposed to money supplies are now being held constant. 
After a capital inflow, money supplies must readjust to meet the constant 
demands – in other words there will be automatic 100% sterilization of capital 
movements.  Although in practice the authorities did attempt to sterilize in many 
countries, they were not completely successful because money supplies tended 
to increase after capital inflows. Again, a simple model closure misses the mark. 
Finally, still assuming that they are targeting the interest rate, the home 
country authorities might also choose to hold reserves constant and allow the 
exchange rate to float. In this set-up, one can show that through both wealth and 
substitution effects the rate would decrease or appreciate after a capital inflow.  
 To summarize for emerging markets, the first closure suggests that an 
interest rate increase after a capital inflow must be due to restrictive monetary 
policy or higher economic activity. The second asserts that with pegged interest 
rates, there should be a degree of automatic sterilization after the inflow. But the 
third says it can’t be complete because appreciation was often observed.19 
                                                            
19 Indeed, as noted above inflation targeting in emerging markets usually works 
by setting high interest rates to bring in capital inflows which lead to anti-
inflationary exchange rate appreciation. 
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Insofar as simple short-run models apply, policy makers appeared to operate 
somewhere amongst the three closures.  
In present circumstances in middle income economies, it makes sense to 
go beyond static Mundell-Fleming or portfolio balance analysis and assume that 
a more-or-less floating rate is determined in spot and future asset markets. In 
effect the spot rate floats against its “expected” future values. The quotation 
marks mean that we view expectations along Keynesian lines as emerging from 
diverse opinions on the part of market participants about how the rate may move.  
 A “speculative” view is that the exchange rate will depreciate when the 
local interest rate decreases. This view makes intuitive sense insofar as low 
interest rates should make national liabilities less attractive. It was perhaps first 
advanced macroeconomically by Minsky (1983). Recent macroeconomic history 
(Frenkel, 2004) suggests that over the medium term the speculative view is the 
more accurate description of exchange rate behavior in middle income 
economies. That is, a high interest rate and a strong currency tend to run 
together. 
 
